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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATEf OF UTAH 
GILBERT R. WILBURN, 
Applicant/Appellant, 
vs. Case No. d60292-CA 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC, NATIONAL 
UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
PITTSBURGH, SECOND INJURY FUND Category No. 6 
and UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS INTERSTATE ELECTRIC AND 
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
— H 
This is an original proceeding seeking review by the Utah 
Court of Appeals of an order of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah which denied the appellant's application for permanent 
total disability benefits under the Utah Worker's Compensation 
Act upon the grounds that the appellant had previously compro-
mised and settled his claim for those benefits. 
This Court is authorized to conduct a review of the lawful-
ness of the Commission's order pursuant to the provisions of 
§ 35-1-83, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issues for review are: 
1. Whether the appellant's Compensation and Settlement 
Agreement is enforceable and thus bars appellant's claim for 
permanent total disability benefits. 
2. Whether the findings of the Industrial Commission are 
supported by substantial evidence. 
3. Whether the order of the Industrial Commission is 
arbitrary and capricious. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Statutory provisions which are determinative in connection 
with the Court's review are: 
1. Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-16: 
(1) It shall be the duty of the commission, and it 
shall have full power, jurisdiction, and authority: 
* * * 
(e) to promote the voluntary arbitration, 
mediation, and conciliation of disputes between 
employers and employees; . . . 
2. Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-84: 
Upon the filing of the action for review the 
court shall direct the commission to furnish and 
certify to the Supreme Court, within twenty days, all 
proceedings and the transcript of evidence taken in 
the case, and the matter shall be determined upon the 
record of the commission as certified by it. Upon 
such review the court may affirm or set aside such 
award, but only upon the following grounds: 
(1) That the commission acted without or in 
excess of its powers; 
(2) That the findings of fact do not support the 
award, 
3. Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-90: 
No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to 
compensation under this title shall be valid. No 
agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the 
premium paid by his employer shall be valid. Any 
employer who deducts any portion of sucbh premium from 
the wages or salary of any employee entitled to the 
benefits of this title is guilty of a misdemeanor, and 
shall be fined not more than $100 for each such 
offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The statement of facts contained in the Brief of Appellant 
Gilbert R. Wilburn is incomplete and thus misleading. It cites 
as "fact" much of Mr. Wilburn's own self-serving testimony which 
was contradicted by other evidence and by cross-examination and 
thus not a proper basis for the findings of the Industrial 
Commission. Thus, defendants submit the following statement of 
facts to supplement and clarify the record: 
1. Mr. Wilburn claims that on April ]J4, 1980, while work-
ing for Interstate Electric, he had occasion to lift a portable 
generator from the floor to his workbench. It was a small 
portable model intended to be moved about manually. This 
activity was not unusual nor unexpected. It was a normal, 
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routine and common function which he did on a regular basis 
while at work. (R. 84-85.) 
2. In a recorded statement which Mr. Wilburn gave on 
May 22, 1980, he indicated that he did not feel pain in his 
back until five to ten minutes after the described lifting. 
His representations were as follows: 
Q. Can you describe what you felt as you, you know 
when you picked this up? 
A. Well after I did it I felt pain in my back. 
Q. How soon after you did it? 
A. Almost right away, fairly soon anyway. 
Q. Okay, so it wasn't while you were actually 
lifting? 
A. Within oh (inaudible). 
Q. Okay, within what? 
A. 5-10 minutes, I don't know. in fact I didn't 
even think anything of it (inaudible). 
(R, 350-351.; 
3. Mr. Wilburn continued working but consulted Dr. Gene 
Smith the following day concerning his low back pains. 
Dr. Smith examined him and then released him to his regular 
work within a few days. He took three days off work and 
underwent some physical therapy for two to three weeks. He 
continued to work thereafter for over a year without additional 
medical treatment. (R. 1, 59-60, 65, 297.) 
4. On February 2, 1981, Mr. Wilburn Was examined by 
Dr. Wallace Hess for the purpose of obtaining a disability 
rating which was then determined to be a 5^ permanent partial 
disability from the claimed work injury plus a 15% permanent 
partial disability due to a preexisting loW back condition. 
(R. 177-180.) Based upon said rating, Wiltjurn was paid for a 
permanent partial disability of 20%, with t!he employer and the 
Second Injury Fund paying their pro rata shares. (R. 102.) 
5. Mr. Wilburn's first medical treatment for his low back 
after April 1980 was on August 18, 1981, when he went to see 
Dr. Gordon Affleck after he had been laid o|ff work on July 31, 
1981. (R. 11, 65-66, 297.) Dr. Affleck pliaced him on tempo-
rary total disability which was paid by the employer from then 
until September 30, 1983. (R. 298-300.) 
6. On June 20, 1983, Mr. Wilburn was reexamined by 
Dr. Hess who noted a degeneration of Wilburh's arthritic 
condition, especially as it affected his ne<:k and ankles, a 
condition unrelated to the industrial injury. Dr. Hess then 
determined that the permanent partial disability was a combined 
total of 36% with 10% assigned to the claimed industrial injury, 
15% assigned to preexisting arthritis in th^ low back, and 15% 
assigned to a non-industrial cervical spine condition. 
(R. 181-189.) 
7. Sometime in late 1983, Mr. Wilburn consulted with 
Administrative Law Judge Jan Moffitt at the Industrial Commis-
sion, who advised him to make a claim for permanent total 
disability. She referred Mr. Wilburn to Attorney Robert 
Shaughnessy, with whom he then consulted. (R. 122-123, 322.) 
8. By his report dated February 1, 1984, Dr. Affleck 
rendered the opinion: "Mr. Wilburn is not capable of any 
significant employment, especially in the area that he has any 
training or capability in." (R. 248.) Thereafter, the appli-
cant contacted National Union, the worker's compensation 
insurance carrier, claimed additional continuing disability 
compensation, and was then referred by the carrier to its 
attorney, Stuart L. Poelman, who met with Wilburn on 
February 24, 1984. (R. 31.) 
9. While meeting with Mr. Wilburn, Mr. Poelman noted that 
the employer and its carrier could raise several defenses to 
Mr. Wilburn's claim for permanent disability, including the 
defense that the events of April 14, 1980, as described by 
Mr. Wilburn in his statement, did not constitute an industrial 
"accident" under the then-existing legal interpretation of that 
concept. It was explained to Mr. Wilburn that if the employer 
and its carrier were successful in asserting that defense, he 
would lose his claim for all additional compensation, including 
future medical expenses. On April 26, 1984, Mr. Wilburn talked 
again with Mr. Poelman, at which time Mr. Wilburn noted his 
assertion of a claim for permanent total disability and a 
discussion was had concerning the effect off the "no accident" 
defense of the defendants. Mr. Wilburn was told to seek the 
advice of other counsel. He suggested, and Mr. Poelman 
concurred, that he confer with Judge Jan Mqffitt or Judge Tim 
Allen at the Industrial Commission. The trade offs of a 
settlement were discussed, and Mr. Wilburn then offered to 
settle for an additional 10% permanent partial disability. 
(R. 129-130, 322-323.) Thereafter a verbal agreement was 
reached and a written Compromise and Settlement Agreement was 
prepared by Mr. Poelman and sent to Mr. Wilburn on May 31, 
1984. (R. 35, 115.) 
10. In June 1984 Mr. Wilburn consulted with Attorney Shaun 
Howell, legal counsel for the Industrial Commission, and asked 
her for her advice concerning the settlement. (R. 112, 
117-119.) During that consultation, Mr. Wilburn knew of the 
risk he might take by pursuing his claim to a hearing. 
(R. 117.) Attorney Howell had met with Mr. Wilburn on various 
occasions: first when he brought in an application seeking a 
continuation of total disability benefits ahd indicated that he 
-was going to make a claim for permanent total disability; again 
when he delivered some medical records to Ms. Howell for her 
review; and then again when he brought in a copy of the written 
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Compromise and Settlement Agreement for review. (R. 134-138.) 
Attorney Howell testified at the hearing before the Industrial 
Commission that during those discussions it was clear that 
Mr. Wilburn was asserting a claim for permanent total dis-
ability, that he knew of the defenses which had been explained 
to him by Mr. Poelman, and that she discussed those defenses 
with Mr, Wilburn, including the "no accident" defense which, if 
successful, would bar him from entitlement to future medical 
expenses. (R. 113-114, 141, 145.) 
11. After considering the initial written Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement, Mr. Wilburn returned and asked that the 
agreement add payment to him of an additional $1,590.00 for 
temporary total disability for the period of September 30, 1983 
to November 22, 1983. The defendants agreed and the written 
agreement was then revised and sent to Mr. Wilburn for his 
signature. He then read it, asked Judge Moffitt about it, and 
signed it. (R. 115, 144.) It was then sent to the Industrial 
Commission on November 1, 1984, and was approved by the Commis-
sion through its legal counsel, Shaun Howell, on November 28, 
1984. (R. 36, 40.) Defendants then made payment to Mr. Wilburn 
as specified by the agreement. (R. 115-116.) 
12. When Mr. Wilburn entered into the written Compromise 
and Settlement Agreement he was age 63 and had not worked for 
over three years. (R. 119.) He was then on total disability 
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under Social Security and was claiming that he could not work. 
(R. 93, 119.) At the time the settlement agreement was entered 
into, it was the understanding of the defendants that the agree-
ment compromised and settled Mr. Wilburn's claim for permanent 
total disability. (R. 151.) 
13. On February 13, 1986, Mr. Wilburn, through his attorney 
Michael Dyer, filed an application with th^ Industrial Commis-
sion seeking permanent total disability benefits from the 
defendants. (R. 43.) The defendants answered the application 
asserting various defenses, including the fact that the claim 
is barred by the Compromise and Settlement Agreement thereto-
fore entered into with Mr. Wilburn. (R. 44-45.) Hearing on 
the application was held on May 14, 1986, before Administrative 
Law Judge Richard Sumsion. (R. 49.) Judge Sumsion issued his 
Tentative Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on 
May 28, 1986, whereby he found Mr. Wilburn to be permanently 
and totally disabled, referred him to rehabilitation services 
as required by statute and imposed liability for permanent 
total disability upon the defendants. (R. 338-345.) However, 
pursuant to a Motion for Review and Clarification filed by the 
defendants and responded to by counsel for Iplr. Wilburn 
(R. 357-371), Judge Sumsion issued his Supplemental Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, whereby he vacated his 
prior interim order of May 28, 1986, and ru^ed that the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement entered into between the 
parties and approved by the Commission on November 28, 1984, is 
binding and precludes the applicant from asserting his claim 
for permanent total disability. (R. 372-376.) Counsel for 
Mr. Wilburn then obtained review of the Supplemental Order by 
the full Commission. (R. 377.) Memoranda covering all of the 
issues raised in this appeal were then submitted to the 
Commission. (R. 380-406.) Upon review, the Commission denied 
appellant's Motion for Review, with all three commissioners 
concurring. (R. 407.) 
14. Included in the findings of The Industrial Commission 
are the following: 
(a) The defendants were in good faith in asserting 
the defense that the alleged event did not constitute a 
compensable accident. (R. 339.) 
(b) Mr. Wilburn clearly contemplated asserting a 
claim for permanent total disability several months before 
he executed the Compromise and Settlement Agreement. 
(R. 341.) 
(c) It was the clear understanding of the parties 
that the trade off contemplated by the agreement included a 
relinquishing of Mr. Wilburn's claim for permanent total 
disability. (R. 341.) 
(d) The parties stipulated in th£ written agreement 
itself that there was a bona fide issue as to the compens-
ability of the applicant's claim at th£ time of the 
agreement. (R. 38.) 
(e) The agreement had been approved by the Industrial 
Commission's legal counsel. (R. 40.) 
(f) Settlement of industrial claims is usually a 
desireable objective from a policy standpoint. (R. 373.) 
(g) Mr. Wilburn had been advised to and did discuss 
his claim with an attorney prior to signing the Compromise 
and Settlement Agreement. (R. 373.) 
(h) Mr. Wilburn discussed the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement with the Commissio|n • s legal counsel 
who approved the settlement after discussing with 
Mr. Wilburn all of its ramifications. (R. 373.) 
(i) Mr. Wilburn gave long and serious consideration 
to the execution of the agreement and the agreement was not 
prepared on the spur of the moment and |signed hastily. 
(R. 373.) 
(j) The applicant understood the possibility of 
losing medical benefits if he were to Ipse his claim on the 
issue of "no accident." (R. 373.) 
(k) A settlement agreement such a£ that of 
Mr. Wilburn's is valid under Utah law when an issue 
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concerning the compensability of the claim is at issue. 
(R. 372.) 
(1) To invalidate Mr. Wilburn's agreement would 
seriously undermine the entire settlement process, render-
ing such so uncertain and unpredictable as to seldom be 
worthy of serious consideration. (R. 374.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
1. The Supreme Court has validated agreements between 
employers and employees to settle worker's compensation claims. 
2. Legislative and public policy favor such agreements as 
approved by the Industrial Commission. 
POINT II: 
1. The evidence of record, reviewed in light of Utah law 
as it existed when the Compromise and Settlement Agreement was 
negotiated, demonstrates that the defense of "no accident" was 
asserted in good faith and was a bona fide issue to be nego-
tiated. 
2. The Industrial Commission's findings of defendants' 
good faith is supported by substantial evidence. 
3. The closeness of an issue, if it is bona fide, cannot 
be raised in later proceedings as a factor to invalidate the 
settlement agreement. 
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4. The issues settled by an agreement^ cannot be later 
litigated and the results of such litigation then used to argue 
whether the issue was a bona fide issue at the time of the 
settlement. 
POINT III; 
1. The Industrial Commission's finding that the Compromise 
and Settlement Agreement contemplated the Settlement of the 
appellant's claim for permanent total disability is supported 
by abundant evidence. 
2. The Industrial Commission's findirlgs in this case 
cannot be changed by the Court of Appeals ijnder the statutory 
and common law standards of review imposed upon the court. 
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ARGUMEKT 
POINT I. 
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN AN EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE 
COMPROMISING AND SETTLING A DISPUTED CLAIM 
OF LIABILITY UNDER THE UTAH WORKER'S COMPEN-
SATION ACT ARE VALID AND ENFORCEABLE, 
In the case of Brigham Young University v. Industrial Com-
mission of Utah, 279 P. 889 (Utah 1929), the Utah Supreme Court 
long ago established that an employer and employee may enter 
into a binding settlement agreement which compromises and 
settles an employee's claim for Worker's Compensation benefits. 
In the BYU case, the claim in question included, among other 
things, a dispute concerning whether the employee was injured 
by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment 
and also whether or not the alleged accident was the cause of 
the employee's subsequent death. Thus, at issue was the very 
compensability of the claim. The Court specifically addressed 
the affect of what is now designated as § 35-1-90, Utah Code 
Ann., which reads: 
No agreement by an employee to waive his rights 
to compensation under this title shall be valid. No 
agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the 
premium paid by his employer shall be valid. Any 
employer who deducts any portion of such premium from 
the wages or salary of any employee entitled to the 
benefits of this title is guilty of a misdemeanor, and 
shall be fined not more than $100 for each such 
offense. 
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Contrary to the assertions contained in Appellant's Brief 
herein, the Court ruled that said statutory provision does not 
preclude a valid and enforceable compromise and settlement 
agreement as between the employer and the employee. In so 
doing, the Court stated: 
Let it be assumed that it is competent for the Legis-
lature to restrict the right of the employer and 
employe to make settlements or impose Conditions upon 
which they may be made, yet in our opinion the 
Legislature has not, either by express language or by 
necessary implication, done so. 
The section of this Act referred to do^s not, in our 
judgment, support the view that the ridht of the 
employer and employe to settle a clainvarising under 
the Act after it has arisen is circumscribed or 
prohibited. 
The right of parties sui juris to settle their own 
controversy and avoid litigation is a valuable and 
absolute right, and may be exercised by them under all 
circumstances, unless the state, under 
of police power, has circumscribed, res 
proper exercise 
tricted or 
prohibited it. Holding as we do that such inhibition 
or restriction neither expressly or by Necessary 
implication is manifest by the Act, we think the 
parties had the undoubted right to make the settlement 
which was made by them. 
Id. at 892-893. 
In the instant case the Industrial Commission has upheld 
the validity of Mr. Wilburn's Compromise anfl Settlement 
Agreement and specifically noted the Commission's policy with 
respect to such agreements. 
The settlement of any claim is usually a desireable 
objective. The settlement of a disputed claim is 
particularly desireable because an adjudication of the 
claim seldom satisfies both parties and frequently 
leads to appeals and delays that thwart the benefi-
cient purposes of workmen's compensation legislation. 
The policy of the Commission has been, and should 
continue to be, one that encourages the settlement of 
claims. It has been the long-standing practice of the 
Industrial Commission to approve settlements. This 
practice has operated as a safeguard against abuses 
that might otherwise occur, if an unscrupulous 
employer or insurance carrier attempted to take 
advantage of an unsophisticated worker seeking to 
settle a claim without the advice of counsel. The 
practice also affords some protection against clerical 
errors in the calculation of benefits payable to an 
Applicant. 
(R. 373.) 
Appellant further attempts to rely upon the case of Barber 
Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 135 P.2d 266 (Utah 
1943) to support his attempt to invalidate his own settlement 
agreement. The Industrial Commission specifically addressed 
the Barber Asphalt case in its findings and noted that it is 
distinguishable from the BYU case as well as Mr. Wilburn's 
case, since in both the BYU case and Mr. Wilburn's case the 
settlement involved a disputed claim of compensability. The 
Commission noted: 
In the Barber Asphalt case there was no issue as to 
the fact that the applicant's injury arose out of or 
in the course of employment as a result of a compen-
sable industrial accident. This was in sharp contrast 
to the BYU case in which the Court specifically stated 
that the compensability of the claim was a close issue 
"concerning which reasonable minds might well differ 
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and the right of the applicant to recover was doubt-
ful." 
(R. 372.) 
The Barber Asphalt case did not invalidate all settlements 
of Worker's Compensation claims nor did it overrule the BYU 
case. It simply held that where the compensability of a 
worker's compensation claim is not disputed, an employee 
cannot, by agreement, waive his claim to future compensation 
since the Worker's Compensation Act vests the Commission with 
continuing jurisdiction to increase an awa^d upon a showing of 
a change in the employee's condition which was not known at the 
time of the original award. Nothing in tha Barber Asphalt case 
prohibits an employer and employee from settling claims which 
have already accrued, nor does it prevent tihe final settlement 
of a claim when the compensability of that si aim is at issue. 
In considering Mr. Wilburn's claim, th^ Industrial 
Commission specifically found that his Compromise and Settle-
ment Agreement was entered into for the purpose of resolving an 
issue concerning the compensability of his claim. At issue was 
whether or not "Ir. Wilburn's lifting of th^ portable generator 
during the course of his work constituted an "accident" within 
the meaning of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. The 
Commission correctly applied the holding of the BYU case and 
found that the Barber Asphalt case was not applicable. The 
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Commission thus held that Mr. Wilburn's agreement was enforce-
able, that it was the intent of the parties under such agree-
ment to settle the claim for permanent total disability and it 
therefore barred Mr. Wilburn's claim for permanent total 
disability as filed thereafter. 
The Appellant cites certain cases from other jurisdictions 
in an attempt to support his claim that his settlement agree-
ment should be invalidated; i.e., Walcome v. Paul Mushero 
Construction Co., 498 A.2d 593 (Me. 1985); Hansen v. Jer Her 
Builders, 366 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 1985), and Ruiz v. City of 
Albuquerque, 577 P.2d 424 (N.M. 1978). A critical review of 
these cases reveals that they do not support the Appellant's 
position with respect to the validity of settlement agreements 
between the employer and the employee. On the contrary, each 
of those cases upholds the validity of such agreements. In all 
three cases the compensability of the claim was not even at 
issue, and, even so, the court upheld the agreement insofar as 
it settled the particular accrued claims covered by the agree-
ment. The issues addressed in those cases merely involved a 
determination of what claims were covered by the agreements. 
In the Walcome case, the court found that the settlement agree-
ment only covered the claimed foot injuries and that a claim 
for back injuries, arising out of the same accident, was not 
covered by the agreement. The court did not refuse to enforce 
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the agreement as to the foot injuries. It simply defined the 
scope of the agreement. In the Hansen case, the settlement 
agreement was held to be valid and enforceable with respect to 
the vision impairment which it expressly covered. The written 
agreement expressly provided that "all oth^r claims are left 
open." Thus the court remanded the cases ^or a factual 
determination concerning what other injuries to the head, other 
than vision impairment, had been sustained as a result of the 
industrial accident. In essence, the court was simply enforc-
ing the settlement agreement in conformity /^ith its express 
provisions and the intent of the parties, ^nd again, in the 
Ruiz case, the court upheld the settlement Agreement as valid 
and enforceable but determined that its scojoe was limited to a 
settlement of claims "described in the complaint." It was 
determined that the agreement did not cover a claim for 
rehabilitation benefits since such had not been included in the 
complaint referred to. 
Appellant also cites the case of Cretelja v. New York Dock 
Co., 45 N.E.2d 429 (N.Y. 1942), as supporting his position. 
However, a review of the Cretelia case reveals that it deals 
only with the issue which was addressed by t[he Utah Court in 
the Barber Asphalt case. In Cretelia, the Compensability of 
the claim was not at issue. The court simply held, as the Utah 
court held in Barber Asphalt, that because c^f the Commission 
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continuing jurisdiction, employers and employees had, under New 
York law, limited powers of settlement. The court determined 
that the agreement under review had failed to comply with the 
New York law. The court did not, by its ruling in Cretella, 
invalidate the compromise of a worker's compensation claim 
where the compensability of the claim was at issue. 
Thus, appellant has failed to cite a single case, either in 
Utah or in any other jurisdiction, which supports the invalida-
tion of Mr. Wilburn's Compromise and Settlement Agreement with 
the defendants. The BYU case is the law in Utah and should be 
followed. 
As noted by the Industrial Commission, there are good 
public policy reasons for allowing an employer and employee to 
settle claims to the extent that they have already accrued or 
where the compensability of the entire claim is at issue. The 
Worker's Compensation Act favors an expedited resolution of 
claims. For this Court to invalidate the resolution of accrued 
claims by means of settlement would be counterproductive to the 
intent of the Act. Without the power to settle, employers and 
employees would be forced into endless and unnecessary litiga-
tion. The order of the Commission in this case should be 
affirmed. As the Commission noted: 
To invalidate the agreement at this time would 
seriously undermine the entire settlement process, 
render such so uncertain and unpredictable as to 
seldom be worthy of serious consideration. 
(R. 374.) 
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The Legislature specifically gave the Industrial Commission 
the power and duty to foster the expedited resolution of claims 
under the Workman's Compensation Act, Section 35-1-16(1) of 
the Act provides: 
(1) It shall be the duty of the commission, and 
it shall have full power, jurisdiction, and authority: 
* * * 
(e) to promote the voluntary arbitration, 
mediation, and conciliation of disputes between 
employers and employees. (Emphasis added.) 
Certainly it was the intent of the Utah Legislature that 
the Commission should have the authority to resolve such 
disputes by means of a settlement which it scrutinizes and 
approves. Such was the action by the Commission in regard to 
Mr. Wilburn's claim. 
POINT II. 
THE COMPENSABILITY OF WILBURN'S CLAIM WAS A BONA 
FIDE ISSUE WHEN THE COMPENSATION SETTLEMENT AGREE-
MENT WAS EXECUTED AND APPROVED. 
Appellant urges that the Mno accident" defense asserted by 
the defendants, was not sufficiently significant to establish a 
bona fide issue of compensability. The Industrial Commission 
found otherwise . . . and for good reason. The significance of 
the no accident defense must be assessed by understanding the 
status of the law on that issue as it existed at the time of 
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the agreement, not as it is now subsequently changed. At the 
time of the agreement, the issue of what constituted an 
industrial "accident" so as to support a claim for worker's 
compensation benefits had been the subject of substantial 
litigation resulting in Supreme Court decisions which had 
generated inconsistent results. Consequently, various 
administrative law judges at the Industrial Commission were 
deciding the issue based upon differing factors and differing 
emphases. This inconsistency created an uncertainty which 
caused an increasing number of claims filed with the Industrial 
Commission to be litigated. The inconsistency in court deci-
sions has now just recently been acknowledged and a solution 
has been addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), 
wherein the Court stated: 
Prior decisions by this Court have often failed 
to distinguish the analysis of the acts in question 
and the discussion of causation elements. As a result, 
this Court and the Commission are faced with confusing 
and often inconsistent precedent. For this reason, we 
now undertake a fresh look at the policy and histori-
cal background of the worker's compensation statute in 
an attempt to provide a clear and workable rule for 
future application by the Commission. 
Id. at 18. 
At the time Mr. Wilburn and the defendants entered into 
their Compromise and Settlement Agreement, the defendants were 
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justified in believing that there was a good chance of prevail-
ing on the "no accident" issue should the matter be litigated. 
Court decisions upon which they could rely placed emphasis on 
the accidental and unintentional nature of the activity or 
event which caused the injury, not upon the accidental and 
unintentional nature of the injury itself. In 1969, the Court 
had decided Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 
454 P.2d 283 (Utah 1969), wherein the Court denied compensation 
in a case where the employee herniated a disc in his back while 
riding in and driving a long-haul truck, there the Supreme 
Court stated: 
There is nothing in this record that shows any 
unusual event, or "accident," if you pljease, justify-
ing compensability within the nature, intent or spirit 
of the workmen's compensation act. To conclude other-
wise would ensure every truck driver, every railroad 
engineer, every airplane pilot, and a lot of others, 
against a physiological malfunction or physical 
collapse of any of hundreds of human organs completely 
unproven as to cause, but compensable only by virtue 
of the happenstance that the malfunction, collapse or 
injury occurred while the employee was on the job, and 
not home or elsewhere. 
Id. at 285. 
In 1979, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case 
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Industrial 
Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979), in which it denied 
compensation under the Worker's Compensation Act for a herni-
ated disc which occurred when the employee, after having set up 
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a series of chairs, sat down to rest and then stood up suddenly 
to answer the telephone. There was.no dispute as to the causal 
relationship between the herniated disc and the work activity, 
but the Court denied compensation on the grounds that no 
accident had occurred. In so doing, the Court stated: 
The only facts relating to the claimed accident 
were presented by the testimony of Thurman, and there 
is nothing contained therein that warrants a conclusion 
that an accident occurred. There is nothing in his 
testimony that shows anything unusual about his activi-
ties, that shows any unusual exertion or strain, or 
that shows any contact with objects or a fall. There 
is simply nothing different about his activities on 
the day in question than on any other such working day. 
Id. at 329. 
Thereafter, the Court decided the case of Farmers Grain 
Co-op v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980), and denied compen-
sation to Mr. Mason who, it was found, sustained injury to his 
back as a result of unloading 100 pound bags of whey from a 
delivery truck. The court noted that Mr. Mason had suffered 
from back ailments prior to his alleged accident and the Court 
stated: 
The evidence further reveals that the type of 
work activity engaged in by defendant (that of unload-
ing heavy cargo) was not unusual or unexpected. The 
work was typical of that of a truck driver and compar-
able to the work he had followed for a number of 
years. Further, the aggravation of his physical 
condition gradually developed without the intervention 
of any "external occurrence" or trauma. 
Id. at 239-240. 
Then again in 1982, the Court determined, by its opinion in 
Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P. 2^3 722 (Utah 1982), 
that an employee who injured his back whilfe unloading boxes in 
the course of his employment was not entitled to worker's 
compensation benefits since no "accident" had occurred. Citing 
numerous prior decisions, the Court applied its strict inter-
pretation of "accident" in upholding the determination of the 
administrative law judge that: 
The activities of this morning wei*e not unusual 
and were not strenuous in any way. He had only loaded 
a couple of boxes and was doing the same thing that he 
frequently did in connection with his employment in 
unloading boxes which usually required bending over 
and picking them up. He has done the ^ame thing many 
times in the past. 
Id. at 723-724. 
* * * 
In order to recover worker's compensation bene-
fits, the applicant must have incurred an injury as 
the result of an accident during the course of his 
employment. Though it is clear that the applicant was 
engaged in his regular employment and t|hat there was 
an injury, we cannot find that there wals an accident 
in the sense contemplated by the worker's compensation 
statutes . . . 
Id. at 724. 
The mere fact that defendant's impairment 
resulted (in the words of Dr. Maumberger) "entirely 
from the incident which he alleges to" $hould not 
imply that a compensable accident has occurred, as 
defined in this opinion. 
Id. at 726 
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With this background of judicial decision, and faced with 
the facts of the Wilburn claim as then analyzed by counsel for 
the defendants, there can be no question that the defendants 
asserted the "no accident" defense to Mr. Wilburn's claims in 
good faith, as found by the Industrial Commission, At that 
time, defendants had then determined that Mr. Wilburn1s lifting 
of the portable generator did not involve any external trauma, 
nor did it involve any unusual event. It was one of 
Mr. Wilburn's common, usual and intended activities at work. 
Moreover, he had indicated in his statement that his back pain 
did not occur until five to ten minutes after that lifting 
episode. It had further been determined that Mr. Wilburn 
suffered from a preexisting back condition and that the onset 
of back pain as a result of lifting activities could likely be 
expected. It was further determined that following the lifting 
episode, Mr. Wilburn had only once been examined by Dr. Smith 
and had not thereafter sought any medical treatment for his 
back, following a short period of therapy, until after he had 
lost his job over a year later. 
The "no accident" defense asserted by defendants was real 
and viable. The parties stipulated in the written agreement 
itself that "there exists a serious and disputed question as to 
whether or not the employer is liable to the applicant for any 
benefits under the Worker's Compensation Act." (R. 38.) There 
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is no evidence in the record that the defendants acted in bad 
faith or that Mr. Wilburn was subjected to any kind of fraud or 
misrepresentation. When a settlement agreement is negotiated 
based upon a bona fide issue of compensability, it should be 
upheld. 
In order to make such an agreement possible, its validity 
cannot later be scrutinized based upon an ifter-the-fact debate 
as to how close the disputed issue was. The closeness of the 
issue is always one of the factors considered by the parties in 
connection with their negotiation of the t^rms of the agree-
ment. That factor is weighed in determining what consideration 
should be paid for the agreement. If the tissue is a bona fide 
one and is asserted in good faith, then it should be sufficient 
to support the validity of the Settlement Agreement entered-
into. To allow the closeness of the issue, if otherwise bona 
fide, to be later litigated and used as a mfeans of invalidating 
the agreement would render impotent any attempt to negotiate an 
agreement in the first place. 
Judge Sumsion properly acknowledged that his own determina-
tion that there was an industrial accident, made in retrospect, 
is not relevant as to whether or not the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement "constituted a compromise and settlement 
of a disputed claim." He correctly found that the compen-
sability of Mr. Wilburn's claim was disputed in good faith, 
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that the "no accident" issue was a bona fide issue at the time 
the agreement was entered into and that it was an issue upon 
which reasonable minds could well differ. (R. 374.) It is 
clear that the defendants and Mr. Wilburn entered into their 
settlement agreement in order to avoid litigation, as well as 
to avoid the risk of the "no accident" issue being determined 
in favor of the opposing party. It would be senseless to now 
hold that the agreement could later be held invalid by reason 
of the actual later litigation of that issue when the whole 
purpose of the Agreement was to settle and thus avoid that 
issue and the litigation thereof. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE AMPLY SUPPORTS THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT MR. WILBURN HAD SETTLED 
HIS CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY. 
Mr. Wilburn attempted to persuade the Industrial Commission 
that, when he entered into the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement with the defendants, he did not understand that he 
was settling his claim for permanent total disability. The 
evidence is overwhelmingly to the contrary, and the Industrial 
Commission found against him on that issue: 
The applicant clearly contemplated asserting a 
claim for permanent total disability several months 
before he executed the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement. There is no evidence of a "subsequent 
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change of condition or a new development not contem-
plated at the time of the release or settlement 
agreement." On the other hand, at the time the 
applicant executed the Compromise and settlement 
Agreement, he was not represented by counsel 
though he had sought the advice of counsel 
the negotiations. The stated basis for 
agreement was to avoid the necessity o£ 
gating the "no accident" issue and, in 
assuring the applicant of a continuation of 
benefits and some additional compensation 
no express provision that the agreemen 
even 
early on in 
executing the 
further liti-
doing so, 
his medical 
There is 
was a tradeoff 
with respect to the applicant's potential claim for 
permanent total disability, even though this clearly 
was the understanding of the parties. 
(R. 341.) (Emphasis added.) 
In Wilburn's case, he was advised to and did 
discuss his claim with an attorney, butl at the time he 
signed the Compromise and Settlement Agreement, he was 
not represented by counsel. He did, however, discuss 
the Compromise and Settlement Agreement 
Commission's Legal Counsel, who approve 
ment after discussing all of its ramifi 
the Applicant. Based upon the testimon 
Commission's former legal counsel who a 
particular Agreement, and based upon th 
own testimony, there can be little doub 
Applicant gave long and serious conside 
execution of the Agreement. This was n 
that was prepared on the spur of the mo 
hastily. It was, in fact, prepared weelks, if not 
months, before it was actually executed] By his own 
admission, the Applicant, at the time the Agreement 
was signed, was extremely concerned about ensuring a 
continuation of his medical benefits which were 
assured if he agreed to the terms of the Compromise 
and Settlement Agreement. If not, there is no doubt 
that the Applicant understood the possibility of 
losing that benefit if he were to lose his claim 
the issue of "no accident." 
with the 
the Settle-
ations with 
of the 
proved this 
Applicant•s 
that the 
ation to the 
t an Agreement 
ient and signed 
on 
(R. 373.) 
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The Utah Court of Appeals is bound by law to affirm these 
findings as made by the Industrial Commission, since the court 
is governed by special standards of review imposed by both 
statute and case law. Section 35-1-84, Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
provides, in part: 
Upon such review the court may affirm or set 
aside such award, but only upon the following grounds: 
(1) That the Commission acted without or in 
excess of its powers; 
(2) That the findings of fact do not support the 
award. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed its interpreta-
tion of this standard of review in the case of Blaine v. 
Industrial Commission, 700 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1985). After 
quoting the above statute, the Supreme Court stated: 
This Court has interpreted the foregoing statu-
tory standard on numerous occasions and has concluded 
that the Commission's findings are not to be displaced 
in the absence of a showing that they are arbitrary 
and capricious. 
Id. at 1086. 
In the Blaine case, the Supreme Court cited 
of Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
wherein the standards of review were discussed: 
Under any of these standards--Kavalinakis, Kent 
and Norris—it is apparent that this Court's function 
in reviewing Commission findings of fact is a strictly 
limited one in which the question is not whether the 
the prior case 
(Utah 1981), 
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Court agrees with the Commission's findings or whether 
they are supported by a preponderance of evidence. 
Instead, the reviewing Court's inquiry is whether the 
Commission's findings are "arbitrary or capricious," 
or "wholly without cause," or contrary to the "one 
[inevitable] conclusion from the evidence," or without 
"any substantial evidence" to support them. Only then 
should the Commission's findings be displaced. 
Id. at 890. 
These standards have been longstanding\ In the early case 
of Twin Peaks Canning Co. v. Industrial Commission, 196 P. 853 
(Utah 1921), the Utah Supreme Court established the standard 
for review of the evidence with respect to Industrial 
Commission cases: 
This Court is now firmly committed to the doctrine 
that it will examine the evidence only 
whether there is any substantial evidence in support 
of the findings of the Commission, and 
acted without or in excess of its juris] 
to ascertain 
whether it has 
diction. 
Id. at 877. 
In the instant case, the evidence supporting the 
Commission's finding that Mr. Wilburn understood and intended 
to relinquish his claim for permanent total disability is not 
only substantial, it is abundant. In fact, with the exception 
of Mr. Wilburn's own self-serving testimonyj, it is nearly 
conclusive. That evidence includes the fact that Mr. Wilburn 
was totally disabled before he ever presented his claim to the 
defendants for additional benefits in February 1984. At that 
time he was 63 years of age, he hadn't worked since July 1981 
(R. 119/ 331); he had already applied for and was receiving 
total disability benefits from Social Security (R. 119); he was 
then representing that he could no longer work (R. 119); 
Dr. Affleck had certified that he was no longer employable 
(R. 248); and both Dr. Hess and Richard Olson from the State 
Division of Rehabilitation had informed him that he was not a 
good candidate for rehabilitation (R. 121, 189). It was 
further noted that when he did claim additional benefits, he 
was asserting a claim for ongoing total disability. Further-
more, Mr. Wilburn admitted talking to Mr. Poelman about his 
claim for permanent total disability (R. 111). He testified 
that he did not disagree with the content of Mr. Poelman1s 
memorandum which outlined some of the factors discussed in 
connection with their negotiation of the settlement agreement, 
including Mr. Wilburn's claim of permanent total disability. 
(R. 129-130.) 
It is also clear that before Mr. Wilburn signed his 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement, he had been thoroughly 
advised concerning its ramifications by both Mr. Poelman and 
the commission's legal counsel, Shaun Howell. He even admitted 
that he had previously discussed asserting his claim with Judge 
Moffitt of the Commission and with attorney Robert Shaughnessy, 
On the other hand, there is no evidence of record that 
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Mr* Wilburn was not claiming permanent totial disability in 
connection with the negotiation of his Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement. His testimony concerning that matter at 
hearing was: "I don't remember, but I cou|ld have." (R. 110.) 
It is further clear from the record th£t in order to secure 
the settlement agreement, the defendants w^re required to pay 
all, if not more, in benefits under the settlement agreement 
than they would have had to pay if the claim had gone to hear-
ing and defendants could have asserted their various other 
defenses. The only thing which Mr. Wilburiji had left to give up 
in exchange for the defendants' waiver of its "no accident" 
defense was his claim for permanent total disability. 
It should be noted that the accuracy o^ Mr. Wilburn's own 
testimony is suspect and that the Industrial Commission is not 
bound to accept such testimony without qua]jification. In the 
case of Bain v. Industrial Commission, 199 P. 666 (Utah 1921), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
. . . it must be remembered that the filndings and 
conclusions of the Commission on questi 
conclusive and final, and not subject t 
Before this Court can disturb such find! 
conclusions, it must appear as a matter 
they are contrary to the law and contra 
evidence. The Commission are the judge 
credibility of the witnesses, and in de 
facts, if there is any substantial reas 
should not believe the testimony of any 
witness, they have the undoubted right 
and eliminate it from consideration. 
Ions of fact are 
|o review, 
ings and 
of law that 
ry to the 
|s of the 
termining the 
on why they 
particular 
fo disregard it 
Id. at 666-667, 
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It was obvious that Mr. Wilburn's testimony was, in some 
respects, contradictory or contradicted. It was, in other 
respects, exaggerated. For example, Mr. Wilburn initially 
testified that prior to April 14, 1980, he had no back 
problem. (R. 53.) Upon cross-examination, however, he 
admitted to having some back problems. (R. 82.) The medical 
records in evidence amply demonstrate that he had significant 
preexisting back problems. Mr. Wilburn also testified both at 
the hearing (R. 127) and by sworn affidavit (R. 328) that he 
had never been advised to seek the assistance of counsel in 
connection with the negotiation and execution of his Compromise 
and Settlement Agreement. This testimony was squarely contra-
dicted by the applicant's own testimony to the effect that when 
he met with Judge Moffitt in 1983, she provided him with a list 
of attorneys, and he then conferred with Attorney Robert 
Shaughnessy. (R. 122-123.) It is further contradicted by the 
testimony at hearing of Attorney Shaun Howell (R. 145) and the 
memorandum of Stuart Poelman (R. 322). Mr. Wilburn also testi-
fied at the hearing concerning the details of his claimed 
accident and it became apparent that he was embellishing the 
facts beyond and in contradiction to the same description of 
facts which he had given in his statement dated May 22, 1980. 
(R. 347.) Certainly the Industrial Commission was justified in 
discounting the credibility of Mr. Wilburn's own self-serving 
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testimony. Mr. Wilburn claimed that he wai confused by the 
language in the Compromise and Settlement Agreement dealing 
with reimbursements between the employer ar(id its carrier and 
the Second Injury Fund. The Industrial Cortimission was fully 
justified in disbelieving Mr. Wilburn concerning such alleged 
confusion. It is apparent that the confusijon in such language 
was more a ploy by counsel to generate an issue than a true 
source of confusion to Mr. Wilburn. 
Appellant notes that the Compromise and] Settlement Agree-
ment does not contain explicit language deflining the claims 
which were settled thereby. However, it should also be noted 
that the written agreement does not specify what defenses were 
being relinquished by the defendants. Mr. ^ilburn certainly 
does not dispute that the Agreement contemplated that he should 
retain his right to future medical expenses That, too, is not 
set forth in the Agreement. Obviously the Written Compromise 
and Settlement Agreement was not designed t0 specify all of 
those items. Thus, it was incumbent upon tljie Industrial 
Commission to determine those matters from ill of the evidence. 
It was clearly understood and readily ascertained by Mr. Wilburn 
that the intent of the agreement was to ensure him of continu-
ing medical benefits. By the same token, it} is clear by the 
evidence that Mr. Wilburn also intended to Relinquish his claim 
for permanent total disability. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wilburn and the defendants entered into a valid and 
binding agreement whereby they intended to compromise and 
settle their claims, including the claim for permanent total 
disability. Said agreement was carefully scrutinized and then 
approved by the Industrial Commission. Mr. Wilburn1s later 
attempt to reassert his claim for permanent total disability 
was properly denied by the Industrial Commission based upon sub-
stantial evidence that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement 
which he signed was understood and intended by him to include 
his claim for permanent total disability. Agreements such as 
that entered into by Mr. Wilburn are valid, enforceable and in 
support of legislative and public policy. Based upon standards 
of review as imposed by the Legislature and as articulated by 
the Utah Supreme Court in past decisions, the Commission's 
order denying the appellant's claim for permanent total 
disability benefits should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of May, 1987. 
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